Data usage and the problem of critical distance in contextual political theory; is sensitivity to data conservative?

Contextual political theory has grown in importance in recent work in political theory. In this approach, attention to data, such as the functionality of institutions and the details of studied cases is part and parcel of the evaluative step in normative political theory. The contextual approach is joined by institutional and positive political theory, in attributing importance to the proper study of data, institutions and case studies, making the attempt to properly understand how to situate political data within normative theorizing important. As a part of a disciplinary move towards data sensitivity, a concern was raised that being attentive to the content of political science sourced data and the functionality of political institutions implies that such attentiveness would limit the normative contours of a given political theory, and will create a theory with a conservative bias. This concern has been called the ‘problem of critical distance’. The current article suggests that one way to appraise the significance of the problem of critical distance is to examine the work done by political theorists who integrate data into their theoretical work in a substantial way, such as Elizabeth Anderson (on racial integration), Leif Wenar (on international trade), and Joseph Carens (on immigration). Reading their work reveals that even though they dedicate much attention to the study of political institutions, their work is not typified by a conservative bias, rather, all three suggest policies that radically depart from settled, contemporary policies. Furthermore, Elizabeth Anderson specifically argued that data sensitivity was what drove her to suggest policies that are radically different from contemporary norms, a phenomenon that is in tension, to say the least, from what the problem of critical distance would expect or foreseen. It is not suggested, however, that the problem of critical distance is bogus or not-genuine. Rather, what the methodology enacted by Anderson, Wenar and Carens can teach us, is that there is no necessary connection between data sensitivity and a conservative bias. Rather, much depends on two different kinds of considerations. The first, what function do the noted data fulfil within the theorizing of a given political theorist? The second, what are the general normative commitments of the theorist? The problem of a critical distance will only appear if the two questions are answered in a certain way. Put differently, the likelihood that a given theory will suffer from the problem of critical distance and hence from a conservative bias, will depend on the type or kind of usage of data by a given political theorist, her/his normative standpoint, and the manner in which the two coalesce or differ. To conclude, while the problem of critical distance is not bogus, its actual applicability is narrower than is at times assumed; this conclusion implies that contextualism should not be considered as a conservatively biased methodology.