This paper focuses on the role of political opposition in the twenty Italian regional legislatures. Italian regions have experienced a dramatic transformation in their institutional structure during the last fifteen years, by moving from a “parliament centred” to a more “executive based” system of government. The institutional equilibrium between legislative and executive bodies was altered by the introduction of the direct election of the head of the regional executive, in 1995, and by a new mechanism establishing the automatic dissolution of the regional councils, if a motion of no-confidence is approved against the (head of the) executive. As a consequence, a great functional differentiation between the “renewed” regional actors (executive, majority and opposition) was expected to occur.
In this paper we address, in particular, the issue of the institutionalisation of the opposition. The questions we aim to answer to are the following: to what extent do the new regional statutes and the internal rules of the regional councils identify “the opposition” as a recognisable and organised political subject? What kind of rights and prerogatives are granted to the opposition in the regional legislatures? Despite almost all the regional statutes mention the issue of opposition, there is a great variability in its definition and in the means and procedures provided to perform its tasks.
We intend to extend our analysis also beyond these formal aspects. The effectiveness of the opposition’s activities in controlling the executive and determining the agenda of regional councils will be the object of empirical investigation. We will test, in particular, how political fragmentation and lack of incentives to act as a unitary actor (which characterises many regional statutes) have a negative impact on the action of regional opposition parties even in this new majoritarian era.
