How much control do opposition parties have over plenary agenda in European legislatures? How can cross-country variation in such agenda powers be explained? This paper examines patterns of agenda control rules in 12 western and east-central European democracies (the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, France, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, and the United Kingdom). In identifying the levers of agenda control, the article focuses on three key stages of the legislative process: (i) recognition of bills, (ii) the placing of bills on the order book, and (iii) scheduling of bills for plenary readings. In its explanatory framework, the article develops and tests a theory of legislative organization that accords primary explanatory value to constitutional design, in particular to the degree of electoral proportionality and supermajoritarianism. The paper originates from a large comparative project on patterns of agenda control in European democracies that the author leads at the University of Oxford.
