Fact-sensitive Political Theory

Political theory and political philosophy typically focus on logical possibility. We have a number of striking (im)possibility results in this sense, such as Arrow’s theorem and Sen’s Paretian Liberal. Less formal work in conceptual analysis has also uncovered a large range of logical contradictions in previously long-accepted political platitudes. By logical possibility, we mean possibility across all conceivable or stipulable state of affairs, whether those states are actual or not. Nozick’s utility monster, Foot and Thomson’s trolley problem, Rawls’ original position, Sen’s Lewd and Prude, etc. are all drawn from the hat of logically possible (though mostly non-actual) states of affairs. In this paper I suggest there is a similar role for empirical discoveries. Many conceivable state of affairs are in empirical fact impossible. The thought experiments that seem to defuse the ‘ought implies can’ principle, for instance, trade on empirically impossible states of affairs. Many of the classic critiques of utopianism are motivated by the notion that the utopia in question is a posteriori impossible. Rousseau’s critique of the social contract tradition also had this logical structure. Even notorious idealists like Kant were eager their visions of perpetual peace were empirically possible in the sense they did not rely on unrealistic assumptions about human nature. Despite the importance of empirical possibility in the canon, modern methods in political theory and political philosophy rarely touch on it. This risks overlooking one of the most obvious points where the discipline can systematically engage with the social sciences. In this paper I outline some analytical tools that can help start towards this goal.