(Ethno-)regional parties and national parliamentary behavior, Spain 2004-2011

Regional parties, particularly those with ethnic or nationalist traits, are often confronted with strategically complex situations. On the one hand, they reach out to their potential supporters on the basis of particularistic regional, nationalist or ethnic appeals. On the other hand, in order to further their goals they may need to collaborate with national or statewide parties, and at times be implicated in national policymaking. This paper focuses on the behavior of regional parties, defined as those that present candidates in a limited number of electoral districts, as actors in national parliament. It analyzes regional party collaboration with (or opposition to) national parties, defined as those that present candidates in all or nearly all electoral districts in a given country. Using the Spanish case, it attempts to explain regional party support for or opposition to national parties governing in minority at the national level. Spain is a multi-level state, where political power resides at various territorial levels (e.g. in local, regional, national, and supra-national governments). Thus, the paper introduces a multilevel territorial logic to help explain minority governing dynamics. The paper posits that the governing situation of a regional party (that also has representation in the national parliament) at the regional level, affects its incentives to support a national minority government in the national parliament. It identifies four regional governing situations: Vulnerable: regional party holds at least one cabinet position in a minority regional government that does not contain a cabinet member from the party governing in minority at the national level. Dependent: regional party holds at least one cabinet position in a majority regional government that also contains a cabinet member from the party governing in minority at the national level. Incongruent: regional party holds at least one cabinet position in a majority regional government that does not contain a cabinet member from the party governing in minority at the national level. Independent: regional party does not hold a cabinet position in the regional government. The specific hypotheses to be tested are that a regional party in a vulnerable situation is the most likely to support the national government, followed in order by parties in dependent, incongruent and independent situations. In vulnerable and dependent situations, the national party governing in minority can trade its party’s support in regional-level institutions or other side payments in exchange for regional parties’ support in the national parliament in a classic you-scratch-my-back; I’ll-scratch-yours strategy. Because of their greater vulnerability vis-à-vis governing, regional parties governing in minority are most likely to support a national minority government. The incentives for regional parties to support the national minority government diminish if the regional party does not require the support of the national governing party to govern at the regional level (incongruent) or if it is in the opposition (independent). Because governing allows the regional party to directly capitalize on regional side payments, regional parties in incongruent situations are more likely to support the national minority government than those in independent situations. The degree of regional party support for the national party governing in minority is measured using the Rice index of voting likeness between each regional party and the governing PSOE in the national parliament. Data are from the two minority governments in Spain (2004-08 and 2008-2011). Additionally, the linkages between regional governing status and national parliamentary behaviour are evaluated using evidence gathered from extensive qualitative interviews with key national and regional political party actors.