Proxy-led accountability for Natural Resource Extraction in Post-Conflict Transitional States

Communities in post-conflict transitional states increasingly find multiple proxies, often from abroad, holding industries and relevant authorities accountable for extractive harm on their behalf. This article develops a conceptual framework for investigating proxy-led accountability, illustrated with examples from the Democratic Republic of the Congo (mining), Ecuador (oil drilling) and Lebanon (quarrying). Across these cases, we identify an ‘hourglass’ phenomenon of proxy engagement with affected communities: In a first phase, proxies rely on public mechanisms to define standards remotely. In a second phase, based on private and voluntary logics of accountability, proxies ‘narrow’ the gap to these communities for the sake of information gathering on (non)compliance. However, in a third phase, this gap ‘widens’ again when proxies sanction local actors, for instance by restricting international market access. While new forms of accountability have the potential to address extractive harm, our cases demonstrate risks of misinterpretations, paternalism and further marginalization of citizens in transitional states.