Delegation and Stewardship in International Organizations

International organizations (IOs) are driven by political-administrative interactions between member states and IO secretariats – international public administrations (IPAs). To model these interactions and understand their outcomes, scholars have predominantly, and almost exclusively, relied on Principal-Agent (P-A) theory. Yet, as this paper argues, delegation can also take a form of stewardship, where goal conflict and information asymmetries are low. In stewardship relationships, member states trust the IO administration, which enables softer, more informal exercise of control. Both agency and stewardship relationships are illustrated in a comparative case study of FAO and WFP. As interview data and document analysis show, while FAO exhibits agency, WFP provides an example for stewardship. The findings imply that not all IO administrations are self-serving agents and that not all delegation relationships are driven by opportunism and goal conflict. Conventional Principal-Agent assumptions should thus not be taken as given. Acknowledging this variation in the modes of member states-IPA relationship is of especial importance considering the increasing contestation of IOs. By delving into trust issues between member states and IPAs, the study thus provides implications as to how IOs can enhance their resilience against both internal and external challenges.