The Wrath of the Places Left Behind - Spatial Inequality and Populist Voting in Germany and the U.S.

Although having lost the latest U.S. presidential election, the number of votes won by populist Donald J. Trump still exceeded many expectations. Similarly, the populist German party Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) experiences continuing support amongst voters. In explaining this support, research often focuses on economic and cultural changes as well as – especially in recent years - rising inequality, all usually associated with the direct effects of progressing globalization (see e.g., Margalit 2019; Mukand/Rodrik 2020; Rodrik 2018). Surprisingly, populist voting in Germany and the United States is highest in less globalized regions that also show rather equal income distributions. These patterns are even more pronounced on the county level, with rural areas not directly affected by the forces of globalization displaying particularly high populist vote shares. My paper addresses this puzzle and answers the research question of how this subnational variance of populist voting can be explained. I answer this question by developing the concept of spatial inequality, which describes the regional inequality that arises as some counties strongly benefit from globalization while other less globalized counties are left behind. I argue that this spatial inequality is a previously overlooked determinant of populist voting, as it creates favorable conditions for the populist anti-elite/people-centrist rhetoric to resonate with voters. Additionally, I argue that this effect is mediated by public good provision, because the inequality induced feeling of being left behind is reinforced by inadequate public good provision. The mechanism I propose draws on an extensive body of globalization and inequality as well as populism research. Although previous research has found that globalization can reduce but also increase inequality (see e.g., Firebaugh 2003; Milanovic 2016; Wade 2004), many scholars point to the general patter that inequality surges within nations because of the uneven spread of globalization benefits (Freeman 2011; Niño-Zarazúa et al. 2017). In analyzing this uneven spread of benefits, the “losers” of globalization, i.e. people with low skills, directly affected by globalization, are usually suspected to vote for anti-globalization populist actors (see e.g., Becker et al. 2017; Kriesi/Pappas 2016). While the early research on the determinants of populism has often focused on the socioeconomic predispositions of these “losers” of globalization (see e.g., Swank/Betz 2003) more recent work has shifted the focus towards the relationship between populist voting and rising inequality within nations (see Pastor/Veronesi 2019). However, the relationship between inequality and populist voting is still not established clearly. Additionally, previous research has mainly focused on the direct effect of globalization and found inconclusive results (Dorn et al. 2018; Rommel/Walter 2018). I address this research gap by shifting the focus towards relative inequality between subnational regions and thereby the indirect effect of globalization. Further, I draw on recent economic research and argue that the provision of public goods mediates the effect of spatial inequality on populist voting (see Diermeier 2020). To test my arguments, I use comprehensive county level data from Germany and the United States to development spatial inequality and public good provision scores.