The ECB and the Commission. Competition, Power Dynamics and Differentiation in EU crisis governance

This paper compares the EU's responses to the financial crises in 2007/2008 and 2020. It argues that EU policies in both cases to a large degree were driven by Germany, the Commission and the European Central Bank, but that executive dominance by the Commission and the ECB increased substantially during the latest crisis, where the two in tandem influenced EU policies far beyond their formal powers. It adds to the existing literature by shedding new light on the relationship between the member states, the ECB and the Commission when dealing with EU crises and in particular by specifying the mechanisms by which executive bodies influence outcomes also beyond the member states' control. All this has important implications for differentiated integration. Since the Commission has to consider all member states, whilst the ECB is concerned with the Eurozone, differentiation is at the heart of any triangular relationship between the Commission, the ECB and member states in the EU’s crisis governance.