A prudential justification for political realism

Political realism has become a popular topic of discussion among political theorists. In particular, two lines of research have recently attracted the attention of many of them. On the one hand, much effort has been devoted in trying to clarify the methodological specificity of realist theorising (see, among others, Baderin 2013; Galston 2010; Hall 2017; Jubb 2017; Philp 2012; Rossi and Sleat 2014, Sleat 2016, Stears 2007); on the other hand, arguments have been proposed to demonstrate the consistency of realism as an approach to political reasoning (see, among others, Hall 2013; Horton 2010; Jubb and Rossi 2015; Sleat 2014). Yet, the very question of the justification of the realist approach has not received the same attention. The studies into the meta-theoretical basis of realism are still few and, as I will argue, they seem unable to offer compelling reasons for the adoption of political realism to a non-realist audience (Hall 2014; Hall and Sleat 2017; Jubb 2019; Prinz 2016; Sagar 2016). Such neglect of the justificatory issue must not look as surprising as it sounds. Indeed, such refrain from justifications could be explained as a consequence of the anti-foundationalist tendencies of political realism. Notably, for political realists, theories ought to be assessed primarily by looking at political reality and what strikes us as sensible to do, rather than by providing stable foundations and absolute systems of norms. Yet, if a persuasive justification of the realist method were not found, political realism would result vulnerable against moralist critiques. In this paper, I will defend a justification for political realism by taking advantage of the argumentative strategies that realists have moved against moralist thinking. More specifically, I will propose a prudential argument in favour of political realism. My primary aim will not be interpretive: I will not argue that the argument outlined is the one that the realist thinkers that I will consider had in mind, though I do not exclude this possibility. Rather, I will outline a possible argument, more or less implicit in realist writings, which I take to be the most forceful strategy to employ against the critics of political realism. I will proceed as follows. I will first introduce a characterisation of political realism as anti-moralism. Then, by availing myself of the recent studies into the meta-theoretical basis of realism, I will outline three possible arguments in favour of the realist approach to political theorising: the meta-ethical, the ethical, and the prudential arguments. I will explain that the prudential argument offers the most solid basis to construe a defence of political realism, because–compared to the other two arguments–it relies on less controversial premises. Even though I regard the prudential argument as the most persuasive, for two reasons I first delve into the meta-ethical and the ethical arguments: first, the prudential argument is essentially built taking advantage of the theses defended by the rival arguments and, second, unfolding the diverse justificatory strategies will give me the chance to comparatively showing the strengths of the prudential argument.