The aim of this paper is to explain the balance of power between parliamentary majorities and minorities by stressing the importance of temporal factors. Political time is supposed to matter in three respects: firstly, with respect to the distribution of parliamentary time as a crucial indicator of the relation between parliamentary majorities and minorities. Secondly, time matters as regards the sequencing of basic conflicts about the distribution of parliamentary time and, thirdly, the timing of these conflicts, i.e. their relation to the external context.
The paper argues that parliamentary time can be distributed according to different rationales. Whereas the classical concept of parliamentary agenda control assumes that parliamentary actors primarily aim to directly influence legislative output, the concept of agenda powers used here has a broader focus. Parliamentary actors can distribute parliamentary time in order to increase parliamentary legitimacy, effectiveness, and efficiency. Due to the different interaction orientations these rationales imply, the sequencing of basic conflicts about the distribution of parliamentary time can serve as an independent variable explaining different relations between majorities and minorities in parliaments.
On the empirical level, the paper aims to assess the sequencing of these basic conflicts in two diverse cases: the United Kingdom (where majorities enjoy substantial privileges) and Germany (where minorities enjoy substantial privileges). The period of investigation is the intensification of political competition between 1860 and 1914. Methodologically, my goal is to discover the causal mechanism underlying the decisions about parliamentary agenda powers in a qualitative analysis based on contemporary sources. To render the results comparable, the relevant interactions will be conceptualised game-theoretically.
In the United Kingdom, two major parliamentary actors (the Conservatives and the Liberals) decided to grant no substantial rights to parliamentary minorities. Since the legitimacy of the House of Commons was comparatively undisputed, the conflict about parliamentary agenda powers was mainly one about parliamentary efficiency, enabling both major actors to frame reforms as measures against “obstruction” (of a third actor, the Irish nationalists). In Germany, decisions on parliamentary agenda powers were taken while the legitimacy of the Reichstag was disputed, with parliament struggling for recognition by voters. Even legislation was perceived as means to increase the (output) legitimacy of the German parliament. This explains why parliamentary actors in Germany acted less coherently and were not willing to emphasise majority rule as much as their British counterparts. The different rationales underlying reforms of parliamentary agenda powers in the United Kingdom and Germany can also be explained by their timing, most notably the reverse relation between parliamentarisation and democratisation. This gives rise to the conclusion that the sequencing and the timing of basic conflicts about parliamentary agenda powers are able to explain the distribution of time in parliaments and hence the balance between of majority rule and minority rights.
