Empirical or explanatory studies of European Union’s political arena have provided both practitioners and scholars with valuable insights into the complex interactions between decision-makers and interest groups. Various indicators of influence have already been identified. These include information exchange, conflict, institutional preference and decision-making procedure. All are thought to have a bearing upon an interest group’s ability to influence the EU policy-making process. However, these factors have proven incomplete and difficult to validate when seeking to determine their relative impact as well as the their reproducibility across policy, procedural and institutional environments.
This paper, drawing on 10-year working in the field and three case studies, discusses indicators for interest group influence over decision-makers in the European Parliament. Examining the indicators of influence in the European Parliament demonstrates the need to examine certain indicators according to their institution relevance. Indicators discussed include access, degree of conflict, decision-making procedure, type of influence, as well as indicators such as precedent (legislative and issue precedent), timing of intervention and arena (individual, institutional and inter-institutional). Indicators are mapped through a detailed examination of the network of relationships, powers and roles of all the key actors in the European Parliament’s decision-making process for three legislative dossiers: Cosmetics Directive 2003/15/EC, REACh Regulation 1907/2006 (Chemicals), and Directive 2010/63/EU on Laboratory Animals. The three case studies share a theme, animal experimentation and testing, while each having different outcomes (victory versus compromise) and different numbers and configurations of stakeholders and alliances.
The case studies have sought to maintain a standard approach for sampling and analysis, while exploring the complexity of networked relations and influence indicators. Limited in scope (EP only) and theme specific (not sector specific), the studies offer insights into the importance and impact of legislative precedence for themes, institutional and inter-institutional power balances, but also networks of relationships between decision-makers as well as between decision-makers and interest groups. Moreover the case studies provide strong evidence of the importance of personal relationships and thus examining influence not only from the perspective of interest groups, but also from the perspective of individual interest group representatives.
