Conflict management and conflict resolution have much to do with how conflicts are represented—as secessionist or revolutionary, conflicts over resources or religious extremism. These characterizations and the inter-relatedness of security strategies have important consequences for their trajectory—whether they are exacerbated or resolved. I argue in my thesis that these decisions are the result of a complex and inter-related set of factors that inscribe the construction of insecurity, identity and interests within the broader social and political context in which these decisions are made. Extending the dyadic peace argument[1], we may envision a similar process at work in the context of internal conflicts. The way the state responds to insurgents, criminals or anti-state elements may have to do with how it represents them. It is possible that the state considers certain types of activities more threatening than others. The decision to use force therefore may stem from how big a threat it considers the actors or their demands to be. Are the actors involved ‘misguided youth’ or ‘terrorists’? Who can be negotiated with? Are the demands of the rebels’ demands for secession or autonomy? Essentially, these are basic questions for determining the legitimacy or illegitimacy of issues, which have an implication for policy practice. It is in this context of security, force and democracy that India can provide a useful case for analyses. India provides a ready canvas for studying a myriad of simultaneous internal conflicts. Comparing the legitimization strategies of the Indian state in three situations-Kashmir, Punjab and the Naxalite (Maoist) conflicts is possible through a study of discourses and identification of the pattern or scale of delegitimization of actors and demands and the implication of these on conflict resolution policies.
