This paper examines the design of regional trade agreement (PTAs), in particular commitments regarding "behind-the-border" regulations concerning trade. The study conceptualizes a trade agreement as a multi-faceted processes in which states negotiate provisions in tandem, and commitments in different issue areas are interdependent as a result. In doing so, states also negotiate “tradeoffs” in the various provisions, balancing commitments toward trading partners against autonomy in the making of trade policy. The paper provides an empirical analysis of the determinants of states’ commitments in "behind-the-border" rules and regulations that go beyond tariff liberalization. The analysis examines the interdependent nature of RTA-design through a multi-equation model. The paper advances the current scholarship by considering not only the institutional variability of PTAs but also the dynamics of the bargaining process that brings about particular outcomes and the “tradeoffs” participants must make in fashioning trade governance through international agreements.
