Power-sharing and the paradox of federalism: Federalization and the evolution of communal conflict in the case of Belgium (1979-2018)

Does federalism accommodate or aggravate communal tensions in divided states? This paper addresses this question from a power-sharing angle. It provides an unprecedented longitudinal analysis of communal conflicts against the background of federalization in a least-likely case: Belgium (1979-2018), a consociational federation with a split party system and a notorious reputation of political tensions. The evolution of communal cabinets is exposed with original data on the frequency (absolute/relative) and intensity of all conflicts in central-level cabinets (N=1069). All indicators forcefully contradict the paradox thesis. Despite five waves of state reform in a highly unfavorable context, the evolution of communal conflict does not show any upward tendency. Rather, there are fuzzy fluctuations and if anything, the prevalence and intensity of conflict shows a tentative decline. Also, clashes on communal issues are far more frequent than conflicts in which the communal segments actually stand oppose. Apart from contradicting the paradox of federalism, this study also challenges conventional ideas on the role of other factors at stake (including bipolarity, the electoral system, and a split party system).