Judicial Councils and Internal Independence of Judges: the Georgian Experience

The vast majority of studies on judicial independence focus on its external dimension (political influence). Considerably fewer studies focus on its internal dimension (influence of judicial superiors over their colleagues). The paper contributes to this latter line of scholarship. I look particularly into judges’ independence from the Councils for the Judiciary. The Georgian Council for the Judiciary decides on judicial careers: it is responsible for judicial appointments, promotions, transfers, initiation of disciplinary proceedings. The existence of formal safeguards against misuse of these powers by the Council (for example, requirement of transparency as regards the process of decision-making in the Council and reasons behind the Council’s decisions) does not guarantee that judges will decide independently and impartially in cases that involve the Council as a party. This can be the case especially where pre-existing informal norms render newly introduced formal guarantees of independence futile (which is common in the post-Soviet context). I have analyzed 85 decisions involving the Georgian Council as a party, delivered between 2013 and 2020. This analysis revealed that judges consistently decide in line with the preferences of the Council. My goal is now to ascertain if the Council’s consistent wins can be explained by judges’ dependence and lack of impartiality OR other factors, such as judges’ perception of their own role and limitations of that role, norm of deference to the Council, judges’ loyalty to the Council and their sense of togetherness. In identifying the factors influencing case outcomes, I will rely on the texts of the decisions, in-depth interviews with judges and experts as well as off the bench statements made by judges in connection with specific decisions or policies of the Council.