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The implementation of international environmental conventions in multi-level systems

Comparative Politics
Environmental Policy
Federalism
Institutions
International
Regression
Johannes Müller Gómez
Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München – LMU
Johannes Müller Gómez
Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München – LMU

Abstract

A large proportion of countries worldwide have committed to taking action against global environmental challenges. Conventions such as the UNFCCC, CITES or the Ramsar and Stockholm Conventions set common goals for environmental protection, reduction of pollutant production and emissions, conservation of biodiversity and climate change mitigation. However, not all states meet these obligations to the same extent. This paper is especially interested in how multi-level structures affect a country’s capability to fulfil its international environmental commitments. In contrast to centralised unitary states, federal or decentralised regimes face the structural challenge that the central government regularly cannot achieve the goals to which it has committed without the action of the federated or regional entities. Heterogeneous interests at the level of the constituent units pose an additional test for multi-level systems. Existing literature has particularly dealt with policy preferences, party politics, public opinion and interest groups as explanatory factors for different levels of international compliance and environmental performance. Research interested in political institutions has focused on the number of veto players and the system of interest representation, ignoring the specific effects of multi-level structures. As a result, we know little about how specific forms of federalism and decentral governance affect a system's capability to meet its environmental obligations. Against this backdrop, this paper asks the following question: What are the effects of federal and decentralised structures on the fulfilment of international commitments? By bridging the existing gap between comparative federalism and the international compliance literature, I develop a set of hypotheses that point to institutional specificities that potentially affect a country’s capability to fulfil its international obligations. I test these hypotheses by employing a multivariate regression analysis, including all signatory parties to the six major international environmental conventions.