A large-n exploration of interest group access across the political–administrative divide

The paper examines whether interest groups’ level of access to executive venues is biased in favor of business groups. It presents a nuanced approach that takes into account the political–administrative division in the executive branch while accounting for the public exposure of political officials. The empirical analysis, focused on EU governance, shows that the level of access of businesses varies across the political–administrative divide. First, political leaders are more accessible to NGOs than to businesses. Second, within the political level political heads’ staff—who are less visible to the public than political officials themselves—have more meetings with business organizations than with NGOs. Third, civil servants are more accessible to businesses than to NGOs. We suggest this is a consequence of the level of public exposure of public officials, the different informational and legitimacy demands within the executive branch, and preferences regarding group type (i.e., business vs. NGO).