Michael Funke,
Dep. Of Economic History,
Uppsala university
michael.funke@ekhist.uu.se
Paper abstract for the session “Time, Temporality and Timescapes in Politics and Policy”, ECPR Workshop Antwerpen 2012
“The Influence of Time and Timing on the Policy Strategies of Business Interest Associations Regarding Advertising Self-Regulation in Sweden 1950-1971”
As the time and timing of the policy process is often overlooked or merely implied as an independent variable in policy change, further studies of this causal factor is warranted. This paper analyzes how the strategic policy actions of a select number of business interest associations (BIAs) regarding self-regulation of advertising in post-war Sweden were influenced by time and timing. The paper departs from the premise that the main actors were aware of time as both an institution and a possible resource (Goetz & Howlett 2011). As the policy process of self-regulation interacted with the statutory process of regulation, the differences in structure of institutional time between the two policy processes, particularly with regards to the stages heuristic, created both opportunities and constraints for the BIAs (Porter & Ronit 2006). The greater flexibility and lesser transparency of policy process of self-regulation compared to the state policy process created opportunities to quickly try to pre-empt state intervention or placate negative public opinion, such as inviting trade unions and state consumer agencies to participate in tripartite negotiations on self-regulatory reform after a severe public criticism of advertising in 1958 and the re-invention the self-regulatory regime completely in 1968-69 due to similar public pressure and the anticipation of a new statutory regime of consumer and competitive regulation ( presented by the government in 1969 and taking effect in 1971 as the Marketing Practices Act.)
As the corporatist structure of the state made room for business representation on state commissions and the BIAs gave referrals on commissions reports, the BIAs were able to co-ordinate their internal policy processes of self-regulation with those of the state. By doing this, the BIAs attempted to stay one step ahead of the state process by launching self-regulatory reforms aimed at pre-empting statutory laws and trying to spread a pro-self-regulatory message while being active inside the state policy process. Consequently this made the BIAs aware of time as resource, both at their disposal and at the disposal of their counterparts, as the labor movement and the state. The actual timing of policy actions can in turn also be related to internal and external pressure on self-regulation. While many policy reform processes of self-regulation appear to have been caused by real or perceived external pressure (negative public opinion or bad will of advertising in media, fear of state intervention) many actual reforms of self-regulation appear to have been delayed, stalled or halted due to internal conflicts in or amongst the BIAs. These can partly be explained by the tensions described by the organizational theory of the logics of exchange (Schmitter & Streeck 1981, 1999). Here market based members dominated by logic of membership and wary of increased regulation hindered suggested reforms that usually originated from logic of influence oriented legal experts or professional staff. This held until the increase of outside pressure in the form of public opinion, bad will or imminent threat of state regulations made it imperative to act, shifting power in favor of reformers inside the BIAs. The flexibility of the policy process of self-regulation relative state policy process then made swift reform of self-regulation possible as an answer to outside pressure.
