Electoral Systems and the Personal Vote

Electoral systems are the cornerstone of representation. Their rules and functioning shape the channeling of political and economic interests and the extent to which representatives are accountable to citizens. Carey and Shugart’s seminal contribution in the mid-1990s triggered an explosion in the comparative politics literature in the study of the effects of electoral systems, the personal vote and representation. Carey and Shugart’s contribution offered an analytical framework whose capacity to travel and to analyze distinct institutional designs made it highly influential. Many scholars have tested, and extended, Carey and Shugart’s framework, often with contradictory findings. In this paper, our goal is to provide a review of the literature on electoral systems and the personal vote. First, we begin by mapping the intellectual roots of the personal vote concept and to revisit Carey and Shugart’s original argument. Second, we examine the effects of the personal vote on party unity and candidate selection. Third, we look at how electoral systems create heterogeneous incentives for policy-making and legislative organization. Finally, we focus on the road ahead for the literature on electoral systems and the personal vote, that is, we systematically examine overlooked research questions and topics whose analysis would benefit from further study.