Parliamentary oversight: a task for only a few good MPs?

In institutional design, parliamentary systems are weak on ex-post accountability mechanisms. Also, the role of political parties means that the partisan logic dominates the parliamentary oversight activity taking place. Nevertheless, this article explores the question how to move beyond partisan behavior in oversight activity. The paper builds on previous research in parliamentary institutional design, but more specifically focuses on variation in oversight mechanisms and design. The paper investigates empirical parliamentary settings and evaluates if the settings call for only a few good (incentivized) MPs or seem to induce the average MP to engage and take on oversight tasks. The investigation applies a most similar system design with the selection of the five Nordic state parliamentary cases that among other factors have a strong partisan logic in common, are known as strong “working” parliaments, but at the same time have variation in oversight related parliamentary institutional characteristics. The investigation indicates that while the Norwegian case in fact seems to rely on a few incentivized MPs in a strong control committee, the Danish case reflects a more optimistic expectation for the oversight engagement of the average MP.