Gender Quotas in Croatia: One Step Forward, Two Steps Back?

2000 was a milestone for Croatian polity in many ways. For women’s representation the most noteworthy reforms were the introduction of gender equality as one of the highest values of the constitutional order and the shift to the PR system. It was also marked by a sudden increase in women’s parliamentary representation, notably from the ranks of left-wing parties, which in turn stimulated gender equality policy and institutional innovation. The new constitution was used as an advocacy tool, and a legal basis, for the introduction of the Act on Gender Equality – which ultimately prescribed legislative quotas. Yet, since the adoption of quotas no marked improvement in the share of women parliamentarians could be detected. This paper, therefore, answers the following questions: are parties abiding by the quota requirements and nominating more women, and are state authorities sanctioning those that are not? Quota implementation in the last four parliamentary elections that took place after the enactment of the 2008 act was analyzed. Analysis showed that Croatian parties were adjusting to the quota requirements gradually (with the exception of early elections) but those were primarily the smaller parties. There was no gradual adjustment from the major parties. The study has also shown the Kafkaesque proportions of quota violation sanctioning procedure in Croatia. So, the answer to the second question, on whether the parties are sanctioned for non-compliance, is a resounding no. Indictments are not being issued, or are issued years after the infractions occurred, courts are not giving their rulings in a timely manner, and penalties awarded are measly to say the least. This paper outlines various forms, whether explicit or implicit, of resistance to quota implementation. The major factors influencing this process were institutional and intra-party. The latter is evident in parties’ autonomy in the candidate selection process, ideological differences of the two major parties, and electoral strategies of the smaller ones. The former in the dysfunctionality of institutional coordination and inadequacy of the judicial response. In conclusion, in Croatia, quotas were adopted but did not truly come to life.