National De-delegation in a Multi-Level Setting: Independent Regulatory Agencies in Europe

National politicians in Europe have created independent regulatory agencies (IRAs) to regulate markets such as communications and energy and delegated important powers to them over competition, tariffs, and service provision. After delegation, they have engaged in politicization of IRAs, and sought to re-design initial delegations. Yet, while there have been numerous episodes of attempted or actual de-delegation, overall, de-delegation over the period 2000-2020 has been limited: many de-delegations have been abandoned, temporary or reversed, and also counterbalanced by extensions of delegation. EU legal coercion has been a significant factor, operating through processes of threat of legal action pre-empting de-delegation, monitoring and enforcement of existing EU legal requirements on IRAs’ powers and independence, and EU legislation expanding the powers and protection given to IRAs. Even for national agents, who are more vulnerable to de-delegation than trustee non-majoritarian institutions, the ability of national politicians to reverse delegation has thus been constrained by multi-level institutional settings.