The recent financial and economic crisis has troubled the world in an unprecedented synchronicity and with severity: States found themselves threatened by a systemic collapse of the world’s system of financing which would have immeasurable consequences for capital and economy. Because of this threat European countries have developed a form of crisis management that is partly directed by the European Union but mostly realized on a national scale. It can be differentiated into political reactions to the crisis in the financial markets on the one hand and on the other hand into reactions to the economic crisis. For the proposed paper the latter is of particular importance. Therefore I raise two questions: Firstly how and by whom were fiscal-decisions made in the recent crises? And secondly do oversized coalitions have any effect of MP‘s rights within the decision-making processes in fiscal policy?
These questions should be answered by a qualitative comparison of Westeuropean countries.
The case-selection includes Germany and Sweden because in the recent crisis both show oversized majorities: The Grand Coalition in Germany and the Bürgerliche Allianz in Sweden. After the last decades the Federal Republic showed minimum winning coalitions while Sweden was mostly governed by a minority Government. Within the recent crisis the majorities were much more robust and might give the executives more power. Both countries react with stimulus packages including fiscal measures.
While the role of parliament concerning fiscal questions is an important one, strong executives might try to govern without parliaments in times of crisis.
Using the Veto-Player-Theory I will demonstrate how Members of Parliament assess their influence and opportunity of controlling and monitoring. The investigated qualitative data are based on my Research-Interview-Results with Political Actors from both logics: The government and the parliament.
