This paper explores the institutionalisation of time in the administration of the European Commission and probes its implications for the intra-organisational distribution of power. It examines both formal time rules and temporal regularities governing central administrative processes and time rules and regularities at the level of political mandates and tenures of senior officials. In assessing the linkage between time and power in the Commission, the analysis focuses on two time-sensitive relationships: between the political level – the College of Commissioners – and the administrative level; and between central coordination units – notably the Secretariat-General – and line units. A time-centred examination of the Commission administration reveals that there is a strong ‘temporal subtext’ to growing politicisation and centralisation, two trends that have featured prominently in recent writing on the Commission. Thus, senior administrators’ tenures have become quite closely aligned with those of Commissioners, so that the former’s incentive to ‘take the long view ‘ has, to some extent, been eroded; political time-setting, monitoring and enforcement have gained in prominence, reducing the temporal discretion of the administration; and central ‘keepers of the clock’ have gained in power. It is an open question whether, as a result, the Commission progressively loses the temporal capabilities typically associated with non-majoritarian institutions, especially an extended time horizon and time consistency in action.
