Politicization of EU executive power: a comparative analysis of the European Commission and the ECB.

In the Summer of 2019, following European parliamentary elections in May 2019, two women were nominated to become the first female presidents of the most powerful institutions in the European Union's executive branch. Ursula von der Leyen was nominated as president of the European Commission (EC), and Christine Lagarde as president of the European Central Bank (ECB). Both picks may have come as a surprise at that time, but on closer inspection, this choice is part of a broader process of politicization of the EU executive. This paper focuses on the politicization of the EC and the ECB. Both executive institutions have played a key role during the Eurozone crisis. Both institutions have stretched their mandate and expanded their policy remit. Pressures from national and European politicization have made that both the European Commission and the ECB, have become aware of the political importance of public perceptions of their actions. The paper starts with the presentation of a framework for conceptualizing the politicization of executive institutions. This framework breaks the politicization of executive institutions down into two distinct conceptually coherent dimensions concerning the organizational features and the policy function of the executives. An empirical comparison of the EC and the ECB, under the presidency of von der Leyen and Lagarde, shows a differentiated pattern of politicization across these two executive institutions. Based on these findings, the paper discusses the impact of this differentiated executive politicization for legitimacy and performance, and for the mechanisms to hold these EU executive institutions accountable.