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National Administrative Representatives' Contributions to EU Agencies' Development

Executives
Governance
Institutions
Public Administration
Martin Weinrich
Osnabrück University
Martin Weinrich
Osnabrück University

Abstract

National representatives hold the majority in EU agencies’ decision-making bodies. But influencing a decision in this networked, multi-level setting is costly: Coordinating an agreement with a (qualified) majority is time-consuming, especially for representatives whose prime affiliation is their home agency. Thus, national representatives often act passively while Commission representatives pro-actively shape EU agencies’ work and agendas. This paper contributes to the debate about the nature of EU agencies’ control and input structure by asking when representatives of national administrations engage pro-actively in coordination within EU agencies. To do so, it compares the behaviour of national representatives from three smaller and three larger EU member states in a diverse set of four EU agencies covering different tasks (namely EEA, EMA, EMSA and EBA). Facing resource constraints, national officials must prioritize between domestic and inter-institutional tasks. On 47 semi-structured interviews with 53 national and Commission representatives as well as agency officials, the paper shows that across the diverse set of agencies, national representatives safeguard their bureaucratic interest, especially where they risk being overwhelmed by the administrative consequences of EU agency decisions. Only in salient agencies, intergovernmental control concerns play a significant role. Primarily, however, national representatives create synergies between their domestic work and EU agencies’ work. Thereby, they are willing to support an expansion of EU agencies tasks. By valuing the learning EU agencies’ learning opportunities and their consensual decisions, national representatives contribute to transnational components of EU agencies where topics are relevant to them. The findings show how national representatives both constrain and enable EU agencies: Their bureaucratic turf and reputational interest define the boundaries where they to oppose further EU agency action. Their interest in efficient (domestic) workflows and coordination as well as in EU-wide solutions enables EU agencies to expand their scope of action.