Regulatory reform after the World Financial Crisis (WFC) is not only about changing the rules of financial markets but also about dealing with powerful institutions such as large multi-national banks, hedge funds, or co-ordination services firms. The present contribution focuses on one type of powerful actor, the Big Three global credit rating agencies (CRAs), Moody’s, Standard & Poor’s, and Fitch. My starting point is the observation that after the WFC a unanimous international consensus has emerged that CRAs should be regulated. This contrasts quite significantly with the previous period, in which CRAs have not been subject to any regulation at all for nearly a whole century (until 2006). The regulation of CRAs is a rare instance of a post-crisis regulatory paradigm shift. Given the fundamental nature and the geographical scope of this shift, I assume that economic ideas have played a role in shaping a new perspective on CRAs. In this paper, I seek to identify these ideas and ask how they have had an impact.
