Who holds the keys to Swedish policymaking? Illuminating the factors that determine access for voluntary organisations

The question over who can access the corridors of power in policymaking has provoked a great of thought among researchers from various fields, mostly due to the fact that access is one way to influence. The literature has identified several factors that determine voluntary organisations’ access to policymaking, such as the number of members, financial clout and the possession of resources such as expert knowledge demanded by the state in shaping access (Nownes & Freeman 1998; Bouwen 2002; Eising 2007b; Eising 2007a; Smith 2008). Although these studies have built understanding, they tend to focus on business interests and rarely take the entirety of the voluntary sector into account. In addition, recent studies are biased towards the US and the EU (see, however, Uhrwing 2001; Gullberg 2011). This is peculiar since European welfare states have undergone significant institutional transformations over recent decades, in the formation and implementation of public policies often described under the heading of Europeanisation, and new modes of governance, decentralisation and privatisation. To broaden the perspective, this article draws evidence from Sweden. On the one hand, Swedish policymaking is portrayed as being relatively open and deliberative in which a wide range of organisations have access to the policy process (Anton 1969; Premfors 2000). On the other hand, the policymaking style is described as rooted in a corporatist tradition where access has been relatively regulated. Over time, this governance style has changed considerably and evolved towards pluralism (Lewin 1992; Hermansson et al. 1999; Rothstein & Bergström 1999; Feltenius 2004). This is more evident in Sweden than other Scandinavian countries (Lindvall & Sebring 2005:1069f). Taken together, these factors imply a relatively open policymaking process in which the threshold for access is relatively low. However, despite relatively ample research, understanding of the factors that determine access to Swedish policymaking is scarce. Is access for voluntary organisations in the Swedish policy process open or, in reality, restricted? If restricted, what organisational factors determine access? The article draws evidence from a survey of 250 voluntary organisations participating in ‘the remiss procedure’ between 2000 and 2009. This is one of the most traditional arenas for policymaking in Sweden. The mechanism is often characterised as particularly open and deliberative, and somewhere in which a wide range of organisation has been included in order to gather the fullest possible information about an particular issue before a decision is taken. Access is defined as “the status of actors in the Swedish policy process” and represents the close working relationship between politicians, policy makers and “privileged outsiders” (Hansen 1994:22). By focusing attention on the demand side of the political process, i.e. on the organisations that are requested by the state to participate in the remiss system, it is possible to detect organisations having “privileged access”. The research shows that the likelihood of access is three to four times greater for an organisation with plenty of members and an enviable financial resource, and one that has been established since the first half of the twentieth century. Further, having an insider position in policymaking, i.e. being more involved in other more informal decision-making arenas, as well as being capable of providing the information expected from the state, increases the odds of access by about three. However, contrary to the discussion of state-civil society relation in Sweden, being in possession of volunteers within the organisation or receiving state funds does not influence access. The article concludes that the notion of the Swedish policymaking system as open to most voluntary organisations needs to be reassessed. Even with regard to arenas that are considered the most open and democratic, access presupposes certain features among voluntary organisations. This could imply that the threshold for access is even higher in more restricted rooms of power (cf: Uhrwing 2001). Secondly, these results contribute to collective understanding of Swedish state-civil society. To a great degree the features demonstrated here resemble the character of the dominating organisations during the heyday of corporatism - even though this study does not provide evidence of corporatist patterns in Swedish policy (Elvander 1966; Rothstein 1992). It is the member-based, the resourceful and the old organisations with an insider position in the policymaking that are considered legitimate. Finally, these results can also be viewed in the light of the policymaking process at EU level that has been criticised as being closed for less resourceful organisations. According to the results presented here, national politics can hardly serve as a pathway for the interest articulation towards the EU for smaller and less resourceful organisations. References Anton, T. J. 1969. Policy-Making and Political Culture in Sweden. Scandinavian Political Studies, 4, 88-102. Bouwen, P. 2002. Corporate lobbying in the European Union: the logic of access. Journal of European Public Policy, 9, 365-390. Eising, R. 2007a. The access of business interests to EU institutions: towards elite pluralism? In: Journal of European Public Policy. Routledge, pp. 384-403. Eising, R. 2007b. 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