Emotions and Norms in EU North Korea Policy

In the last few years, geopolitical landscape has become more competitive among the United States and China. The Covid19-crisis has exacerbated these trends and it is likely that a rivalry both in terms of “geopolitics” and “geo-economics” will continue apace. On the Korean peninsula, there isn’t much chance for either the resumption of denuclearization talks between the US and the DPRK or for a renewed “maximum pressure”. In 2017, Donald Trump could ratchet up tensions because China was on board. In 2022, it is difficult to envisage that Joe Biden would convince President Xi to tighten, rather than relax, sanctions on North Korea. Given that, policy options available to all the players, including the EU, will be constrained. Any increased tensions on the Korean Peninsula may put the EU at odds with Washington or Beijing, creating an emotional pressure on European leaders. The paper will therefore look whether there are any tools – such as mediation, brokering confidence building, and arms control measures - that the EU could employ on the Korean peninsula in order to “pre-empt” being pushed to choose sides between the US and China and before North Korea becomes a new geopolitical hotspot again while looking how emotions could influence any of their decisions.