This paper focuses on the policy preference formation of societal interests in the context of international trade governance. An increasing number of scholars argue that trade policy preferences of econcomic actors are shaped by the institutional setting of the policy making process, rather than by material interests. It is argued that, as material incentives or economic benefits are often not evident to economic actors, firms (and other stakeholders) are prone to adapt their policy stances and lobby strategies to the structure of the relevant political institution(s) in which a give trade policy decision is taken. Consequently, trade policy preferences of societal interests are expected to be maleable and subject to considerable changes over time. This paper challenges this view and argues that – although institutionalist approaches may help to explain the malleability (or shifting) of policy preferences of econcomic actors during complex and long lasting multilateral trade negotiations – in most cases of trade policy making (e.g. bilateral trade agreements, the imposition of trade barriers) societal interests have often no problems in knowing and acting upon their (material) interests. By examining lobbying carried out by business groups in several goods producing sectors in the EU, the paper shows that firms facing trade policy decisions with (a) a relatively short time horizon, (b) a narrow focus and (c) a direct negative effect on income, have usually very clear cut trade policy preferences – regardless of the exact institutional (trade) policy setting.
