The Ladder of Discriminatory Policy: A Framework for the Systemic Classification of Discriminatory Policy Types

Theoretical models of political agency primarily incorporate elected executives’ self-interest as motivating reelection-seeking behavior, which, in turn, keeps these politicians in check. A concerning trend of democratic backsliding highlights that these models fail to capture populist elected executives who target democracy-protection mechanisms, minorities, and civil society organizations using discriminatory treatment, for example, on the basis of gender, age, religion, sexual orientation, and funding sources. Against this background, I develop the Ladder of Discriminatory Policy, which is conceptualized along two dimensions, namely the scope of target populations and the level of policy tool calibration in the design of discriminatory policies. I tie climbing and descending this modular ladder to system-level policy punctuations; to the discriminatory effects of policies on politically relevant target groups; and to elected executives’ progression between three self-interest constructs with varying levels of self-interest intensity. I explore socio-psychological, institutional, and political mechanisms that may facilitate this progression.