Although PMSCs serve a wide variety of clients in diverse contexts, the consequences of the commercialization of security represented by PMSCs have recently predominantly been debated in terms of PMSCs serving state clients in proxy relationships. Nevertheless, PMSCs are most frequently used to secure and enable businesses in environments plagued by conflict, violence or crime. This study investigates the governing arrangements which result when state authorities voluntarily retreat from the governance of commercial use of commercial security. The paper takes a closer look at the Norwegian regulative arrangements that govern commercial use of PMSCs and examines potential effects of this approach in terms of what (self-)regulatory arrangements (if any) result from this line of policy, and with what consequences for the governance of security. The paper initially examines recent amendments to the regulation of the use of armed guards onboard Norwegian ships as well as those measures meant to regulate the procurement of private security services by Norwegian petroleum companies abroad. Secondly, the paper analyzes the effects of the approach in terms of who governs (the clientele, the providers, insurance companies, or the operating environments’ authorities), through which measures, and with what effects on accountability and transparency of the use of force in the service of business. The paper argues that the Norwegian political approach to nonstate use of private military and security companies largely amounts to a hands-off approach which to a large degree delegates power over the use of force to the commercial companies involved, and that the weak presence of official authority in the governance of security also contributes to the formation of new niches for the security industry, such as selling PMSC quality control services.
