Politicization of conditionality design at the World Bank: the influence of institutional and bureaucratic representation

Research on decision-making in the World Bank has demonstrated that outputs are heavily politicized. The World Bank commits more money, approves more projects, ascribes fewer conditions, and enforces them less stringently when powerful principals—chief among them the United States (US)—have a geopolitical stake in recipient countries. While the politicization of the World Bank, and other International Financial Institutions, is well-established, much less is known about the drivers of this politicization. Many authors have hypothesized that the overrepresentation of the United States in voting shares and staff may be an important contributor to politicization. However, empirical evidence on the link between the overrepresentation of the US (passive representation) and its influence on operations (active representation) remains absent. The article makes two key contributions: First, it develops an argument that links passive representation of the US in voting shares, staff, and active representation in World Bank decision-making. Second, that argument is tested using novel data on the voting behavior of US executive directors, the nationality of key World Bank staff in charge of decision-making, and a survey experiment with World Bank staff members. The article ultimately shows how passive representation and bureaucratic culture combine to give the US a superior ability to influence World Bank conditionality design. The findings have important implications for debates on the influence of powerful principals in the decision-making of International Organizations.