The effect of courts fragmentation on electoral disputes

If the literature on courts in competitive authoritarian regimes has typically viewed the judiciary as a mere window dressing tool or an instrument used by the incumbent to remain in power, empirical evidence from sub-Saharan Africa challenges this assumption. In the last four years, both the Malawian and Kenyan Supreme Courts have ruled against the incumbent and ordered a presidential election rerun. These sparks of judicial autonomy deserve greater scholarly attention. These instances strongly suggest that courts can play a fundamental role not only in consolidating authoritarian control but also, and importantly, democratic development. Hence, my paper aims at identifying the conditions under which judicial resistance occurs during electoral disputes in electoral autocracies. In other words, when – and to what effect - does the judiciary side with the opposition, and why? I argue that specific institutional configurations, inherited from colonial times, have shaped courts and given an advantage to the executive branch. In this paper, I investigate the effect of courts fragmentation on electoral cases outcome. I hypothesize that fragmented courts are more likely to support the ruling regime when adjudicated. To test my theory and exploit sources of institutional variation, I adopt a mixed-method approach that combines micro-level observational studies using original data and qualitative evidence gathered from archival work and semi-structured interviews conducted in Kenya and Senegal. My project has intellectual merit for several reasons. First, this project shows that courts in electoral autocracies are not epiphenomenal and have their own agency. Second, the project highlights the role of formal institutions in African politics. Thirdly, this dissertation project is the very first systematic data collection of court cases, within country, over time that relates to the sanctity of elections. Finally, my project has the potential to have a broader impact by informing democratic institution-building efforts worldwide.