From political conditionality to governance conditionality: The trade-off between peace, democracy and development in EU relations with Ethiopia and Rwanda

This paper explains why Rwanda and Ethiopia have received more and more EU development aid, despite their poor record of democracy and respect for political rights. While traditional realist explanations may partly explain the EU’s reluctance to cut development assistance in Ethiopia (a strategic ally in the war on terror), in the case of Rwanda this explanation falls short. Moreover, both countries are of little economic value to the EU. It is argued that the EU, in the pursuit of peace, development and democracy in developing countries, focuses on peace and development rather than on democracy. The EU is satisfied with the overall ‘governance’ of the Ethiopian and Rwandan governments, and more particularly (1) economic governance (macroeconomic policies), (2) social governance (focus on pro-poor growth), (3) administrative governance (effective spending of development aid, relatively low corruption) and (4) security governance (internal stability). Several reasons are put forward for this lack of focus on democracy. First, the relative ineffectiveness of political conditionality in countries that strongly reject foreign interference. Second, the influence from emerging donors, which further reduce the EU’s leverage in developing countries. Third, doubts about the value of democracy for development and peace and belief that development and peace should come first. Fourth, bureaucratic interests of the EU to look for success stories in development and to ‘spend its money well’.