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Masking the Strangulation of Opposition Parties as Pandemic Response: Austerity Measures Targeting the Local Level in Hungary

Europe (Central and Eastern)
Comparative Politics
Local Government
Quantitative
Austerity
Daniel Kovarek
European University Institute
Daniel Kovarek
European University Institute

Abstract

Much ink has been spilled to describe various tools of autocratic survival, but targeting opposition actors with austerity measures in electoral autocracies is hitherto understudied. This paper argues that the COVID-19 pandemic has provided a rare opportunity for Hungary's Fidesz to disarm opposition parties via cutting off resources of municipalities led by opposition mayors and eliminating any remnants of local governments' fiscal autonomy. Following the 2019 local elections, an ideologically heterogenous coalition of opposition parties succeeded in defeating incumbent Fidesz politicians in urban areas, uniting a fragmented partisan landscape and threatening the government’s reelection in 2022. Opposition mayors campaigned on a platform pledging to introduce democratic innovations, such as participatory budgeting, to invest into healthcare and increase transparency. Whereas Hungary otherwise exhibits one of the lowest levels of local autonomy in Europe, the combination of the opposition breakthrough at the 2019 local elections and COVID-19 created a critical juncture. After a decade, sub-national politics was suddenly characterized by real partisan variance, opposition mayors rushed to overperform the government in crisis management and to enact their agenda. Simultaneously, the pandemic elevated the relevance of local governments, as municipalities organized testing, took care of the elderly and implemented measures limiting mobility. Fidesz used the COVID-19 pandemic and the state of emergency to deprive opposition-led municipalities of their vehicle tax and business tax revenues, pushing them into a fiscal limbo and preventing them from realizing any of their major policy pledges in the absence of available non-earmarked funds. Analyzing original data from government decrees on local transfers, the study contributes to the existing literature by conceptualizing fiscal strangulation as part of electoral authoritarian regimes' toolbox to discredit opposition parties and their ability to govern locally.