On the Possibility and Necessity of Liberal Identity Politics. Why All Camps are Wrong and Kant is Right Once Again

Sven Hillenkamp has recently formulated an axiom of political practice that grounds the necessity of liberal political thought on the categorical imperative: "Every camp, every party, every group, and every individual is wrong on essential points!" Accordingly, in the struggle for freedom and responsibility, the greatest hurdle to common political solutions resides in the fact that we think of ourselves as the good guys and therefore empower us to advocate for certain groups. However, even if one intrinsically wants only the "good", forms of paternalism almost inevitably create evil, because our subjective inclinations run counter to the absolute worth of goodwill (Kant 1785, Metaphysics of Morals). In late-modern societies, this problem becomes evident with current conflicts of identity. They represent a central challenge, not least because identity issues are difficult to negotiate for many reasons. For one thing, there is a debate about whether concepts of (collective) identity are at all capable of representing our social reality as well as our diverse group memberships (e.g., Brubaker and Cooper 2000; Jullien 2021). For another, it is assumed, in terms of practical politics, that collective identities determine political and social action. Associated with this, however, are fundamental questions about the (il)legitimacy or (im)possibility of identity politics (Fukuyama 2018; Klein 2020; Meyer 2021). What many contributions have in common here is that they remain entrenched in dichotomous categories and thus indirectly reinforce camp thinking. Here, one’s notions of identity or a good life can only be asserted at the expense of the other. And while the rifts between the camps are deepening (Reckwitz 2020), we are missing a connection that, in our view, is not to be found in relativistic negation but in relational reference. Kantian thinking is herein the point of departure. The categorical imperative, in whatever form it appears, has, after all, no smaller claim to be the formula of humanity. The human individual as a free and rational being - and nothing beyond is said - must respect other human beings as he does himself. According to Kant's notion of reason, this form of respect is ultimately a "self-wrought feeling" (Kant 1785, Metaphysics of Morals) that always includes others. The maxims by which an action can be gauged need to be consistent with the capacity for autonomy. Only in that case, universally valid rules enable the self-determined, i.e. dignified, coexistence of all human beings (law of nature). Contrary to the accusation that enlightened humanism is merely a cloak for securing existing structures of domination or oblivious to power and history (Mills 2017), universalism stands firmly alongside liberal identity politics that are concerned with demanding fundamental rights. On the one hand, humanistic universalism protects us from the empty liberal neutrality that seeks to preserve power structures from within the political center; on the other hand, only relational identity politics based on respect for autonomy can permanently command the legitimacy it claims from others.