This paper discusses the agents of global financial governance as part of a club model. It suggests that the concept of a club model helps us to understand the relationship between individuals and institutional forms, rather than relying on the assumed interests of the former, or the organisational characteristics of the latter. As such, the paper studies those who write the rules for global finance by examining their peer networks. Those who act within the club model follow its rules, broadly respect who is included and excluded from participation, and are not concerned about whether someone is from the public or private sector. Clubs allow a mix of professional identities while also providing a common purpose that does not rely on highly abstracted shared skills, like a scientific community, or a singular lust for profit, like a class with clearly defined material interests. Instead, economic ideas about appropriate financial governance are debated within the club and emerge as coherent and cohesive policy programmes. Empirically, the paper identifies clubs who inform financial policy-making at the transnational level and examines how the club model as a mechanism of governance affects the process of financial reform and the introduction of new economic ideas.
