Why Russia and China Attractive in the Eyes of Central European Economic Populists?

The world financial crisis brought to the fore two phenomena – the growth of economic populism and the rise of the so-called emerging powers. Among these new powers, Russia and China positioned themselves as additions to the existing system of Brettonwood organizations. As a result, part of the populist parties became attracted by these new powers. In central Europe, the relationship between populist parties and the emerging powers expressed itself in close relations between Orban’s Hungary and Putin’s Russia, while in Poland the anti-Russian long-term sentiment did not allow to move closer to Putin, but the country’s leadership is making some steps towards China. Additionally, the vaccine diplomacy appealed especially to the” pragmatic” leaders such as Orban or Zeman. Despite often only moderate results (Chinese investment, failure to deliver contracted volumes of vaccines), they still stress the pragmatism of this orientation. In this context, the Czech Republic represents a special case of the country, where president Zeman is regarded as a pro-Russian and pro-Chinese politician, while the former Prime Minister Andrej Babiš, was ostensibly not interested in foreign policies. The paper, therefore, explores the mutual attraction of economic populism and the Russian and Chinese capital in the Czech Republic. Why do the populists, despite their disappointing results, still emphasize the bet on Russia and China?