The dominant view in the literature is that the increasingly frequent use of PMCs by governments is a privatisation of the state’s military functions, a process which implies a reduction of the state’s capacity to act politically. From this perspective, the opening up of legitimate markets to PMCs looks less like a transfer of power from the public to the private sector, but the re-regulation of security provision, from international human rights to contract and civil law.
We intend:
• To broaden the debate by focusing on principal-agent approaches to PMCs activity in security governance.
• To suggest that, without some form of control, they are more or less free to behave as they see fit in the environments within which they operate. On the basis that PMCs have a valid role to play in future conflict resolution and peace-keeping, and given that there still is a degree of unease and suspicion within the international community, there is a clear requirement for some form of oversight and regulation. We focus on United States experiences.
