Assessing De Facto Autonomy in the Brazilian Regulatory State

Between 1996 and 2021, Brazil created eleven autonomous regulatory agencies at the federal level. Despite the expansion of the model over this 25-year period, literature hasfor the most part described a perennial state of instability surrounding them. Critics contend that the Brazilian regulatory agencies were strained to the limit especially during left-wing presidential administrations, from early 2003 to mid-2016. A hostile attitude coming from the Executive would have compromised agencies’ autonomy and performance, putting the whole model permanently at risk. We empirically question this assumption through a longitudinal quantitative analysis based on a novel budgetary dataset. Overall, our findings show rising budgetary trends across all the four budget categories that we report on, suggesting a process of continuous institutional embedding even if formal administrative autonomy was not secured. The article’s main contribution lies precisely in unravelling new ways in which de facto autonomy can develop, allowing also for a more nuanced understanding of the level of legitimacy acquired by the regulatory agency model across the political spectrum.