The moralized / non-moralized distinction in conceptual analysis: democracy, secularism and populism

Within conceptual analysis, many political theorists distinguish between moralized and non-moralized concepts. While the former represents always welcomed (or always unwelcomed) phenomena, the latter can be one way or the other depending on degrees and circumstances. The paramount case is freedom: while some authors posit that freedom is a neutral description of lack of impediment, which can be either justified or unjustified, others maintain that freedom is solely a good thing to have, so they construe their definition in a way that is loaded with normative value. Likewise, scholars working on religion in political theory disagree over whether secularism is the neutral description of absence of religion in the public sphere, or otherwise a political value to be cherished, as it embodies the right way in which the state secures equal religious liberty in pluralist and multicultural societies. Drawing on these two cases and their seemingly common structure, this article distinguishes between the moralized and the non-moralized version of populism as a contested concept. As the moralized version goes, populism is plebian rule against an oligarchic minority. An opposed moralized version contends that populism is an inherently anti pluralist phenomenon, therefore prone to authoritarianism. In turn, the non-moralized version abandons the normative discourse to argue that populism, as a sense of rebellion against the elites, can be either a corrective or a threat to democracy, and therefore good or bad depending on the context and its features. The article finally interrogates about the contribution of the moralized / non-moralized distinction as a methodological tool in conceptual analysis and political theory more broadly.