Bargaining Strategies in WTO Negotiations

Over the last decades, the focus in analysing international organisations (IOs) has changed from asking whether such institutions matter (Krasner 1983, Keohane 1984) to examining which aspects matter and how they operate in different contexts (Martin and Simmons 1998, Abbott et al. 2000, Koremenos et al. 2001). One of these aspects that is discussed (not only) in the IO literature deals with negotiations and, more specifically, with member state behaviour in such bargaining situations. IO members may select among different negotiation strategies for which several classifications have been created, inter alia soft vs. hard negotiation strategies (e.g. threats, promises, mutual exchange of concessions etc.) (Hopmann 1996). Diverse factors may influence the choice of these strategies by different IO members, e.g. a country’s power, based on its economic strength. There is evidence from EU negotiations that more powerful states are likely to use hard strategies (Dür and Matteo 2009). Less powerful countries, in contrast, may rather refrain from doing so as such behaviour would not appear credible (Pruitt 1983). In addition to these factors, this paper is the first to examine whether experience in an international organisation affects member state behaviour in negotiations, i.e. whether newcomers (IO members since less than three years) choose different negotiation strategies than long-standing members. Seen from a rational choice perspective, IO members choose their behaviour according to the utility they want to derive from this behaviour: If they conceive that they can optimise their gain out of an IO by behaving in a more conflictual manner, they will choose this strategy, whether they are a newcomer or not. However, sociological theories would hold that newcomers in IOs are in a different position at the beginning of their membership as they are faced with a new environment in which they have to learn the rules and norms and in which they can opt for certain behaviour. Finally, there are further measures negotiating parties may apply to boost their clout in bargaining situations, e.g. they can use internal power sources such as negotiation skills, for instance by appointing an experienced negotiator as delegation leader, or they can increase their negotiating delegation. This study is the first which systematically investigates the reasons for and the use of particular negotiation strategies in the current WTO negotiations, the Doha Development Agenda, using quantitative indicators. For this purpose, I compiled a novel dataset, based on 35 semi-structured expert interviews with WTO diplomats, on the use of negotiation strategies by different delegations in the Doha Round negotiations. These data are used to identify which factors are crucial in selecting a specific bargaining strategy in WTO negotiations. Abbott, K. W., R. O. Keohane, A. Moravscik, A.-M. Slaughter and D. Snidal, 2000: “The Concept of Legalization”, International Organization 54(3): 401-20. Dür, A. and G. Matteo, 2009: “Power and Bargaining Tactics: The Negotiations on the EU''s Financial Perspective, 2007-2013”, Journal of Common Market Studies 48(3): 557-78. Hopmann, P. T., 1996: The negotiation process and the resolution of international conflicts. Columbia: University of South Carolina Press. Keohane, R. O., 1984: After Hegemony. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Koremenos, B., C. Lipson and D. Snidal, 2001: “The Rational Design of International Institutions”, International Organization 55(4): 761-99. Krasner, S. D., 1983: “Regimes and the Limits of Realism: Regimes as Autonomous Variables”. In: International Regimes, S. D. Krasner (ed.), pp. 355-68, Ithaca: Cornell University Press. Martin, L. L. and B. Simmons, 1998: “Theories and Empirical Studies of International Institutions”, International Organization 52(4): 729-58. Pruitt, D. G., 1983: “Strategic Choice in Negotiation”, American Behavioral Scientist 27(2): 167-94.