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FOR THE GREATER GOOD: HOW POLICY NETWORKS ENHANCE INTRA-EXECUTIVE COORDINATION IN FOREIGN POLICY LEADERSHIP

Europe (Central and Eastern)
Comparative Politics
Constitutions
Executives
Foreign Policy
Governance
Decision Making
Vesa Koskimaa
Tampere University
Vesa Koskimaa
Tampere University
Tapio Raunio
Tampere University

Abstract

In the increasingly tense international atmosphere, countries’ capacity to exercise firm and clear leadership is crucial – especially concerning security and foreign policy. This poses challenges for semi-presidential regimes where executive powers are shared between presidents and governments. Since the 2004 EU enlargement, semi-presidentialism has been the most typical regime type in Europe, being especially prominent along the EU’s eastern border. Studies of semi-presidential leadership have traditionally focused on the constitutional balance of power between presidents and governments. However, studies on intra-executive conflict have shown that the level of conflict can vary significantly between countries that share rather similar constitutions. Clearly, something important is happening in the non-formal sphere of coordinative interaction that scholars have only recently begun to scrutinize more systematically. This paper contributes to this emerging project with a focused comparison of two semi-presidential countries, Finland and Romania, that share many constitutional characteristics but differ significantly in the level of intra-executive conflict. Providing a novel perspective on intra-executive decision-making, the study applies the policy network theory and rich qualitative data (official state documents, elite interviews, etc.) to examine, in-depth, the structure and operation of the policy system where presidents and governments exercise their constitutional powers. Specifically, the study seeks to uncover the largely informal (i.e., practice-related) coordination mechanisms that can foster conflict-free cooperation between agents that have incentives and capacities for independent, conflict-inducing action.