FOR THE GREATER GOOD: HOW POLICY NETWORKS ENHANCE INTRA-EXECUTIVE COORDINATION IN FOREIGN POLICY LEADERSHIP

In the increasingly tense international atmosphere, countries’ capacity to exercise firm and clear leadership is crucial – especially concerning security and foreign policy. This poses challenges for semi-presidential regimes where executive powers are shared between presidents and governments. Since the 2004 EU enlargement, semi-presidentialism has been the most typical regime type in Europe, being especially prominent along the EU’s eastern border. Studies of semi-presidential leadership have traditionally focused on the constitutional balance of power between presidents and governments. However, studies on intra-executive conflict have shown that the level of conflict can vary significantly between countries that share rather similar constitutions. Clearly, something important is happening in the non-formal sphere of coordinative interaction that scholars have only recently begun to scrutinize more systematically. This paper contributes to this emerging project with a focused comparison of two semi-presidential countries, Finland and Romania, that share many constitutional characteristics but differ significantly in the level of intra-executive conflict. Providing a novel perspective on intra-executive decision-making, the study applies the policy network theory and rich qualitative data (official state documents, elite interviews, etc.) to examine, in-depth, the structure and operation of the policy system where presidents and governments exercise their constitutional powers. Specifically, the study seeks to uncover the largely informal (i.e., practice-related) coordination mechanisms that can foster conflict-free cooperation between agents that have incentives and capacities for independent, conflict-inducing action.