The purpose of this study is to analyze the constraints produced by the new Romanian parliamentary electoral system on the behavior of the candidates in the electoral race, in comparison to the constraints produced by the plurality rule. The main hypothesis of the study is that the new system generates both inter and intraparty competition. Candidates representing the same party have to work together as a team in order for the party to gain as many votes as possible and to receive as many mandates as possible at the district level. However, they also have to act competitively in order to surpass each other in the number of votes they individually receive, because a candidate’s chances of winning a seat depend mostly on his or her results in comparison to the results of the rest of the party colleagues running in the same district. Also, the electoral college in which a candidate chooses to run for office is also a key factor in winning a seat, as the size of the college, given by the number of inhabitants (and voters) within that college, matters in determining the candidate’s results. Thus, intraparty competition also manifests itself in choosing the electoral district and also the electoral college where to run for office, as larger colleges give candidates a better chance of surpassing their fellow party members.
In order to test these hypotheses, we have used laboratory experiments, as the system has only been used in the 2008 parliamentary elections and therefore, there is no data available to examine the consequences that the system produces in practice, except the 2008 results. The experiments simulate elections in a five college constituency where 3 parties with 5 members each compete, building on the hypothesis that candidates can improve their chances of winning a sit by choosing a particular college to run for office.
