Policy Diffusion through Networks: Evidence from Transnational Public-Private Security Governance

Networks are an important element of world politics and arguably a crucial component of transnational diffusion processes. Yet, despite a growing interest in network theory, international relations scholars know only little about networks and how they affect diffusion processes. Networks are often conceived of as benign environments and are typically associated with unrestrained flow of information and enhanced cooperation. At the same time, however, networks can be highly conflictual in nature. Whilst the general assumption is that all actors involved work towards a shared goal, in reality, they are typically diverse, both in terms of their objectives and organizational cultures and in terms of the resources and knowledge they bring to the governance process. As a result, there is often fervent competition among actors for influence and scarce resources. Thus, while actors can gain from cooperation and exchange of information, distributive conflict is likely to be rife, and power is likely to be important in solving it. How then do networks affect the diffusion of policies and practices both among their members and beyond? Do they facilitate the transfer of knowledge and ideas and, hence, promote policy diffusion? Or are they just a welcome instrument for powerful actors to accomplish desired ends in less costly ways? In this paper, I focus on transnational public-private governance schemes in the security area and how policy diffusion operates within these arrangements. I propose a political model of policy diffusion through networks that highlights the importance of distributional conflicts, strategic interaction, and relative power. When governments, firms, and NGOs agree that a regulatory issue needs to be addressed and that setting up some sort of rules to govern the issue would make all parties better off compared to a situation of no cooperation, they still often disagree dramatically about how exactly the rules should be designed. As a result, they struggle over what rules to choose and which of the available options is adopted depends on what actor or coalition is able to induce cooperation on its most favorable outcome. In such situations, I posit, the structures of informal networks and actors’ positions within them are crucial for understanding how policy diffusion plays out and how individual actors and coalitions are able to affect it. I hypothesize that a crucial resource required to successfully wielding influence over diffusion processes within public-private governance schemes are the informational and strategic advantages that derive from prominent positions in the networks among states, companies, and NGOs involved in governing the issue at hand. In order to substantiate and further refine my argument, I examine the diffusion of policies and practices within two public-private governance schemes in the security area, namely the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme and the Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights. Methodologically, I combine case study methods with network and statistical analysis and draw on data obtained from public and confidential documents, semi-structured interviews, and participant observation.