After the economic crises in the 1980s, the Latin American countries reoriented their economic paths from an imports substitution model towards an outward export promotion model leaded by the private initiative. Liberalization fostered trade integration: old agreements were revived and new ones born in the region. These agreements were created under different principles and political and economic interests, which generated very divergent schemes that explored different ways to approach regional integration. Structural and interest group approaches have attempted to explain this variation. However, a more detailed analysis of the variation of these trade integration agreements is required. Following Baccini, et al (2011) I thoroughly code the variations of trade integration agreements and construct an indicator of depth. Also, in spite of a flourishing literature on domestic institutions, the analysis of the influence of institutional variables has been neglected. In this paper I combine access points theory with veto players theory to argue that different configurations of interests and institutions (aggregated in conceptual dimensions) shape trade integration agreements in systematic and predictable ways. Based on interest groups and institutional variables a spatial statistical model is developed. This paper fits into the literature on the political economy of Latin American trade integration by adapting endogenous trade theory and combining it with rational design to explain the variations in the design of bilateral and minilateral trade integration agreements.
