Avoiding public backlash: Enforcing rule of law in the European Union

Growing public backlash against international organizations (IOs) (i.a. Copelovitch & Pevehouse 2019) and attacks of national political elites on the rule of law increasingly challenge governance by IOs. Public opposition to IOs is fueled by populist attacks on the liberal world order (Börzel & Zürn 2021) and the rule of law. When international organizations seek to enforce the rule of law at the national level, they risk provoking hostile reactions of citizens and fueling public opposition to the IOs themselves. The primary research question that this project addresses is: How can international organizations safeguard the rule of law without provoking public backlash? We develop theoretical arguments that the acceptance of enforcement actions crucially depends on the relevance of procedural fairness, transparency and ideational consistency between the new norms and existing legal rules, and is moderated by how much people (a) already trust the international organizations and (b) identify exclusively with their own country. The influence of these moderating factors is hypothesized to be activated to a greater extent for citizens of countries that are likely targets of rule of law related enforcement actions. These hypotheses are tested using experimental surveys fielded in Poland and the Netherlands. The context of experimental surveys is the enforcement of rule of law by the European Commission and the Court of Justice of the European Union. The findings contribute to our understanding of the conditions that make enforcement actions related to the rule of law legitimate and acceptable in the eyes of European citizens.