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Reform coalitions in neopatrimonial states: case studies into policy conflict in democratic low-income countries

Conflict
Democracy
Elites
Institutions
Political Economy
Developing World Politics
Coalition
Policy Change

Abstract

Wolf and van Dooren contend that “[d]emocracy is organized conflict” (2021, p. 1). The system of democracy sets the conditions for conflicts between rivalling parties to play out in a relatively organized fashion. The notion that conflict is the default in policy strongly echoes the literature on the politics and political economy of development in low-income countries (LICs), which describes development as predominantly a political struggle between rivalling groups over dominance over the political decision-making process and access to resources (e.g. Ferguson, 2020; Hutchison et al., 2014). Whilst authors on conflict in high-income countries (HICs) tend to focus on political strategies to de-escalate and overcome conflict, they operate in the context of strong nation states under the assumption of functional and impartial institutions. In contrast, conflict in democratic LICs takes place within a governance context characterized by a high degree of informality in political decision-making, a concentration of political influence by elite groups, severely limited government resources available for redistribution, and a weak social contract between state and citizens. This paper will investigate how the nature of policy conflict as well as policy repertoires differs in democratic LICs. It will do this by, first, introducing key concepts from the literature on the political dynamics in LICs, such as neopatrimonialism (Mkandawire, 2015). This will allow for a conceptual broadening of ‘conflict’ to highlight the importance of understanding the power and interests of networks of political agents and channels through which political influence is exercised. This in turn yields insights into why certain policies are prioritized, in which spaces policy conflict is resolved, and which actors maintain pivotal positions in the policy process. Second, it will review two case studies of reform coalitions in democratic LICs, supported by international aid organizations that have engaged in conflict with the state over policy reforms. The mobilization of reform coalitions has increasingly been of interest to the aid sector as a modality, because it is better able to address political challenges to development (Hudson et al., 2018). These coalitions usually consist of a combination of reform-minded politicians, civil society groups and business interests, who strategically pool their resources and influence to convince political leaders to support specific developmental reforms. Several case studies of reform coalitions have been documented in detail, providing a unique analytical window into the ways in which conflict is resolved in LIC contexts. These will show, amongst other things, the high degree of informality underlying policy processes and a broad set of repertoires used to engage with the state. The findings from the case studies will also have important conceptual implications for HICs, who may to different degrees be subject to similar dynamics.